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In this paper, we analyze the mixed duopoly, in which the private firm maximizing profit 
competes with the public firm maximizing social welfare under the linear city. This model is not 
price competition like Hotelling (1929) but quantity competition like Anderson and Neven 
(1991) or Matsushima and Matsumura (2003), both firms face the quantity competition of 
homogeneous goods at each location in the city. Moreover, those firms emit any pollution in the 
manufacturing process similar to Naito and Ogawa (2009). The purpose of this paper compares 
the case without environmental regulation with the case regulated by government and analyzes 
the effect of environmental regulation on firms agglomeration. As the result of analysis, we 
show that the environmental regulation affects the location pattern of each firm in the city.  
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Spatial competition model has been extended from 
various points of view since Hotelling (1929) 
specified it, applied in spatial location theory or 
horizontal goods differentiation of industrial 
organization, political economy, and so on and 
affected those greatly. Hotelling (1929) sets up a 
linear city and analyzes the location competition and 
price competition. As for location competition, 
Hotelling (1929) shows that both firms locate at the 
center of linear city under the case, in which they 
supply homogeneous goods for consumer at same 
price. Many researches study how the firms choose 
their behavior under the two stage game, which is 
location and price competition. d’Aspremont, 
Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) shows that 
equilibrium does not exist under the two-stage game 
taking account of a linear transportation cost. On the 
other hand, Capozza and Van Order (1982) assume 
the transportation cost rises with the square of 
distance and show that uncooperative equilibrium 
location is the configuration, in which one firm 
located at one edge of city and the other firm located 
at the other edge of city, that is, maximum 
differentiation.  
The studies of typical Hotelling model assume that 
each consumer in the city purchases a unit of goods 
inelastically and focus on price competition. On the 
other hand, Anderson and Neven (1991) set up 
quantity-location competition and analyze the 
equilibrium price and location. They show that both 
firms locate at the center of city in equilibrium. This 
result is contrary to Capozza and Van Order (1982). 
Though Anderson and Neven (1991) assume that the 
consumers are distributed uniformly in the city, Gupta, 
Pal, and Sarkar (1997) relax the assumption of 
distribution and show that firms can agglomerate the 
center of city with a part of exception when the 
consumers are not distributed uniformly. On the other 
hand, Pal (1998) sets up not a linear city, which 
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Anderson and Neven (1991) assume, but a circular 
city and show that each firm locates with the same 
distance to the other firm. Moreover, Matsushima 
(2001) shows that the half of total firms locates at one 
point in the circular city and the others locate at the 
opposite side when there are plural firms in circular 
city.  
Most of these studies analyze the behavior of firm 
maximizing his profit. On the other hand, recently 
some researchers have analyzed the mixed oligopoly, 
in which the public firm maximizes the social welfare 
and the private firms maximize their profit, since De 
Fraja and Delbono (1990) constructed the mixed 
oligopoly model. Moreover, this mixed oligopoly 
model has also been extended from various points of 
view. De Fraja and Delbono (1990) consider the case 
where the public firm and the private firms have the 
same cost function and both firms face Cournot 
competition. They show that the social welfare in 
mixed oligopoly is larger than that in pure oligopoly 
when the number of firm is enough small. This is 
because the public firm determines his production to 
be equal to marginal cost.  
Many studies applied this mixed oligopoly model, 
which was constructed by De Fraja and Delbono 
(1990), to other various categories. Cremer and 
Marchand and Thisse (1991) introduce the products 
differentiation into mixed oligopoly model. Moreover, 
Ogawa (2006) extends to the case of not only 
substitute goods but also complement goods and 
analyzes the scale of production chosen by firms. 
Though De Fraja and Delbono (1990) consider the 
simultaneous move game, some papers, which are like 
Pal (1998), argue with the timing of game in the 
mixed oligopoly and attempt to determine the move in 
the game endogenously. Ogawa and Sanjo (2007) 
consider the Hotelling model with the quadratic 
transportation cost with respect to distance used in 
Capozza and Van Order (1982) and show that the 
public firm and the private firm do not locate on the 
edge of city. This result is different from that of 
Capozza and Van Order (1982). Moreover, 
Matsushima and Matsumura (2003) analyze the 
quantity-location competition under the circular city 
specified in Pal (1998) and show that the private firms 
locate in the opposite side to public firm location and 
they agglomerate in the same location.  
Some studies consider the case where the firms 
emit any pollution in the process of production and its 
pollution damages the environment and analyze the 
relationship between the firm’s behavior and the 
government’s environmental policy under the mixed 
oligopoly. Under this setting, Bárcena-Ruiz and 
Garzón (2006) compare the mixed oligopoly market 
with the pure oligopoly market with only private firms 
and refer to the difference of pollution tax and the 
privatization. Kato (2006) compares the mixed 
oligopoly market with emission rights trade with that 
without it. Though their studies argue with the 
privatization of public firm in the mixed oligopoly, 
they just compare the mixed oligopoly with the pure 
oligopoly and do not refer to the partial privatization, 
which Matsumura (1998) sets up and any 
environmental regulation. However Matsumura 
(1998) does not deal with the environmental 
regulation. Naito and Ogawa (2009) combine the 
environmental regulation in Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón 
(2006) with the partial privatization model in 
Matsumura (1998) and analyze the effect of each 
environmental regulation on the emission of pollution 
or social welfare in equilibrium and compare among 
some environmental regulations. They show that 
neither full public management the partial 
privatization maximize the social welfare under each 
environmental regulation and that the direct 
environmental regulation, in which the government 
controls the abatement investment of both firms, 
maximize the social welfare.  
This paper is organized as follows. We construct 
the basic model, which combines the mixed duopoly 
market with Hotelling type linear city with 
environmental factor. In section 3 we analyze the case 
without any environmental regulation as benchmark. 
In section 4 we consider the case with environmental 
regulation by government and compare the 
equilibrium without regulation with that with 
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regulation. Finally we refer to the conclusion obtained 
in this paper and the remained subjects in our 
analysis.  
 
We consider the linear city whose length is from 
zero to one. Households reside uniformly in the city 
and purchase the homogeneous goods produced by 
either the public firm or the private firm. We consider 
not the pure duopoly, in which both firms maximize 
their own profit, but the mixed duopoly, in which the 
public firm maximizes the social welfare and the 
private firm maximizes his profit. We denote the 
public firm by firm 0 and the private firm by firm 1. 
Let  represent the location of firm  in 
the city. Each firm emits the pollution in the 
production process.  
	!#" 
Though households reside uniformly in the city and 
purchase the homogeneous goods produced by either 
the public firm or the private firm, we relax the 
assumption that each household buy one unit of goods 
inelastically, which Hotelling (1929) sets up, and both 
firms compete the quantity each other at each location 
in the city. Here following Anderson and Neven 
(1991), let  represent the inverse demand 
function at location  in the city.  
  (1) 
where  and  denote the scale of demand 
and the firm ’s production of goods for the market 
at , respectively.
2
Moreover, we assume that 
each firm bears the transportation cost of goods from 
his firm location to each market and define 
                                                           
2
Here we assume that the scale of demand  is large 
enough as well as Anderson and Neven (1991) 
 as a transportation cost.  
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Though we normalize the production cost to zero, 
each firm emits any pollution in the process of 
production and bears the cost  for the pollution 
abatement investment . Presuming that each 
firm pays for the transportation cost of goods from his 
firm’s location to each market, we can describe 
 as the cost to supply his goods for 
market at , that is,  
  (2) 
Here let  and  represent the public firm’s 
location and the private firm’s location, respectively. 
Moreover, we assume that  without 
generality. Taking account of (1) and (2), we can 
describe the profit of firm  at  as follows. 
  (3) 
 (4) 
Moreover, the consumer surplus at , , is 
given by  
  (5) 

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We assume that both firms emit any pollution in the 
process of production and the environmental damage 
is caused by this pollution. Each firm can decrease the 
pollution with his pollution abatement function. 
Defining  as the pollution abatement function of 
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firm , thus, the amount of pollution emitted 
by firm  is given by . Thus, the total 
amount of pollution at  is as follows.  
  (6) 
Moreover, we specify the environmental damage 
caused by emission at  as follows.  
   
  (7) 
" 
The game in this model is as follows. First each 
firm determines his location in the city. Second they 
determine his production and pollution abatement 
investment. Therefore, following backward induction, 
each firm deals with each firm’s location as given and 
determines his production and investment. Moreover 
each firm determines his location in the city to 
maximize either his profit or social welfare.  
 #"! 
We consider the non-regulation case as benchmark, 
in which the government does not impose the 
environmental regulation on both firms in the city, in 
this section. As we explain above section, the public 
firm determines his location, production, and 
pollution abatement investment to maximize the 
social welfare. On the other hand, the private firm 
determines them to maximize his profit. According to 
(5),3, (4), and (7), we define the social welfare at 
 as follows.  
  (8) 
To begin with, we consider the behavior of the private 
firms (firm 1). Differentiating (4) with respect to 
 and , the first order conditions to maximize 
the profit with respect to  and  are as 
follows.  
  (9) 
  (10) 
On the other hand, because the public firm determines 
 and  to maximize the social welfare, the 
first order conditions to maximize it are given by  
 (11) 
and 
   (12) 
Solving (9), (10), (11), and (12), the equilibrium 
under non-regulation is derived as follows.  
  (13) 
  (14) 
  (15) 
  (16) 
Recall that consumer surplus at , , is given by 
(5). Substituting (15) and (13) into (5),  under 
non-regulation is given by  
  (17) 
Thus, integrating (17) from zero to one, we can derive 
the following total consumer surplus in the city under 
non-regulation, that is,  
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    (18) 
 
As we know form (18), total consumer surplus in the 
city depends on not the location of the private firm but 
that of the public firm. Moreover, differentiating (18) 
with respect to , we know that the public firm’s 
location to maximize  is . Therefore, we 
derive the following lemma.  
 
Lemma 1. The total consumer surplus depends on not 
the private firm’s location but the public firm’s 
location under non-environmental regulation and is 
the largest when the public firm locates in the center 
of city.  
 
On the other hand, as for the damage caused by 
pollution, substituting (13), (14), (15), and (16) into 
(7), we can derive the damage caused by pollution.  
 &!"# 
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Next we consider the profits of each firm. Since 
the locations of firm 0 and firm 1 are denoted by  
and , respectively and we assume , the total 




Differentiating  with respect to , the first order 
condition to maximize  is as follows.  
  (20) 
When the environmental regulation is not imposed, 
the total profit of public firm at equilibrium is given 
by  
  (21) 
Finally we derive , which is total pollution in the 
city under non-environmental regulation. Substituting 
(13), (14), (15), and (16) into (7),  is given by  
  
 (22) 
Differentiating  with respect to , we know 
that the total pollution in the city maximizes at . 
Thus, we derive the following lemma.   
 
Figure 1. The public firm’s location and the 




Lemma 2. The total pollution in the city is the largest 
when the public firm locates in the center of city 
under no environmental regulation.  
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 Since the public firm determines his location to 
maximize (8),  is as follows.  
  
  (23) 
Solving (20) and (23), we can derive the equilibrium 
location of each firm. Particularly, we analyze this 




Figure 2. The equilibrium firms’ location under 
non-environmental regulation 
From Fig.2, the public firm and the private firm do 
not agglomerate each other when the government 
does not the environmental regulation on each firm in 
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Here we adopt  and , 
respectively. The specific method of simulation is as 
follows. To begin with, we differentiate (20) and (23) with 
respect to , respectively. Substituting  
and  into both response functions, we describe them 
within  
the city. The result is different from that derived in 
Anderson and Neven (1991), which is pure duopoly. 
Moreover, we know that it is not the same result, 
which is derived under the circular city like 
Matsushima and Matsumura (2003) and that the 
pollution in the city is not the largest at equilibrium. 
Thus, the following proposition is derived.  
 
Proposition 1.  There is no agglomeration of firms 
under non-environmental regulation. Moreover, the 
pollution in the city is not the largest at equilibrium.  
 

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We have analyzed the case where each firm emits 
any pollution in the process of production and the  
government imposes no regulation on those firms. 
The private firm does not carry out the investment 
about pollution abatement and only public firm 
invests in the pollution abatement to maximize the 
social welfare under non-regulation.  
In this section we consider the case where the 
government takes account of environmental 
regulation and can control the environmental 
investment level of both firms and consider the 
location behavior of each firm. Since we add the 
government to the model in the previous section, we 
need to specify the timing of game again. In this 
section the timing of game is as follows, that is, firstly, 
both firm their location simultaneously. Secondly the 
government determines the environmental 
investments of both firms. Finally, both firms 
compete with the other in Cournot duopoly at each 
market. Though we refer to the environmental 
regulation, we follow the direct environmental 
regulation in Naito and Ogawa (2009). Let  and 
 represent the regulated investment 
level and the profit of both firms under this regulation. 
Thus, the following profit functions of both firms are 





              
(25) 
We derive the equilibrium of this game with 
backward induction. Each firm determines his 
production level because the government in this 
section regulates the environmental investment. The 
first order condition of private firm to maximize his 
profit is as follows, respectively.  
  (26) 
The social welfare function at  under the 
environmental regulation is as follows, that is,  
 
 (27) 
Since the public firm determines only production to 
maximize the social welfare, the first order condition 
to maximize the social welfare is given by  
 (28) 
Solving (26) and (28), we derive the production of 
each firm at  under environmental regulation in 
equilibrium as follows.  
  (29) 
  (30) 
Substituting (29) and (30) into (1), the equilibrium 
price under environmental regulation is given by  
  (31) 
From (31), we know that the price at  under 
environmental regulation does not depends on the 
location of private firm but depends on the location of 
public firm and the environmental investment 
regulated by the government.  
  
  (32) 
  (33) 
Taking account of (29) and (30), the following 
consumer surplus  under the environmental 
regulation is given by  
  (34) 
Moreover, the damage caused by pollution at  is as 
follows.  
  (35) 
From (32), (33), (34), and (35), the social welfare 
under the environmental regulation is described by the 
function of location of both firms and the 
environmental investment regulated by the 
government.  
  (36) 
Differentiation  with respect to , the first 
order condition as to the environmental investment of 
each firm to maximize the social welfare is as follows.  
  (37) 
Thus, the environmental investment to maximize the 
social welfare at  is derived due to (37), that is,  
.  (38) 
We know that the environmental regulation at each 
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market is the decreasing function of the distance from 
the public firm’s location to the private firm’s location 
due to (38). Moreover, substituting (38) into (36), the 
social welfare under the environmental regulation is 
given by the function of location of each firm 
( ).  
# #  !"
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We derive the production of each firm and the 
environmental investment regulated by the 
government. Substituting (29), (30), and (38) into (26), 




Thus, integrating (39) from zero to one, we derive the 
total profit of private firm in the city as follows.  
  (40) 
Supposed that  similar to the previous section, 
we divide the three areas in the city and integrate 
them respectively. Integrating those areas with the 
appropriate range for them, we can derive the total 
profit of private firm in the city . Moreover, 
differentiating them with respect to , the first order 
condition of location to maximize the profit of private 
firm is as follows.  
 
    (41) 
Next we consider the profit of public firm to derive 
the optimal location for public firm. Let  
represent the total profit of public firm in the city, that 
is,  
 
.          (42) 
The following social welfare at  under the 




Integrating  from zero to one, we derive 
 as the total social welfare.  
  (44) 
Differentiating (44) with respect to , the first order 
condition of public firm’s location to maximize the 
social welfare is as follows.  
 
       (45) 
Solving (41) and (45), we derive the equilibrium 
location of each firm under environmental regulation. 
We analyze the equilibrium under this situation and 
adopt the same parameter in the previous section to 
compare with the equilibrium under non-regulation. 
4
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We derive each firm’s response function from (41) 
and (45) and describe them in Fig.3.   
Figure 3. The equilibrium location under the 
environmental regulation 
As you know from Fig.3, the private firm keeps any 
distance from public firm and agglomerates in one 
point each other. On the other hand, each firm 
agglomerates in the center of city, in which  and 
 are equal to . Though the private firm does not 
carry out the environmental investment and determine 
his production and location under non-regulation, he 
has to carry out the environmental investment at the 
level regulated by the government, which depends on 
the location of public firm. Thus, the equilibrium 
location under the environmental regulation is 
different from that under non-regulation. Therefore 
we derive the following proposition.  
 
 
Proposition 2.  Each firm agglomerates in the 
center of city, in which  and  are equal to 
under any environmental regulation by the 
government.  
	#  ! 
In this paper we applied Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón 
(2006) or Naito and Ogawa (2009), in which each 
firm emits any pollution and invest for pollution 
abatement in the mixed duopoly, to the quantity and 
location competition like Anderson and Neven (1991) 
and analyze the effect of environmental regulation on 
the firm’s agglomeration in the city. As the result of 
analysis, the amount of pollution in the city depends 
on only public firm’s location. Moreover, we show 
that the amount of pollution maximizes when the 
public firm locates on the center of city, that is, 
. As for equilibrium location, the maximum 
differentiation location in Matsushima and 
Matsumura (2003) does not emerge under 
non-regulation. Next we consider the case where the 
government imposes any environmental regulation on 
each firm and analyze the effect of environmental 
regulation on each firm’s location in equilibrium. We 
show that it is possible to emerge the firm location in 
the center of city under environmental regulation, that 
is, both firms located in the center of city 
( )  
Since we focused our interest on the effect of 
environmental regulation on firm’s agglomeration in 
this paper, we do not argue with the case about partial 
privatization, which is analyzed in Naito and Ogawa 
(2009) or Matsumura (1998). We deal with only 
direct regulation and do not refer to economic method 
like pollution tax. We have to compare the 
equilibrium location under the regulation in this paper 
with that under other environmental regulation. Those 
points are remained in the future subjects.  
%"!
   Author gratefully acknowledges financial support 
from Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology for its financial support (No. 
22330095). A previous version of this paper was 
presented at the Korea Institution and Economics 
Association International conference in 2010. The 
―　　―37
Environmental Policy and Firms Agglomeration under the Mixed Duopoly
author thanks Young Sung Yoo, Moriki Hosoe, 
Hikaru Ogawa, Shigeharu Sato, and Woohyung Lee.     
 
 !
[1] Anderson, S.P and D. J Neven, 1991, “Cournot 
competition yields spatial agglomeration,” 
International Economic Review, Vol. 32, (4), 
793-808. 
[2] Bárcena-Ruiz J.C and M. B Garzón, 2006, “Mixed 
oligopoly and environmental policy," Spanish 
Economic Review, Vol. 8, 139-160.  
[3] Capozza, D.R and R Van Order, 1982, “Product 
differentiation and the consistency of 
monopolistic competition: A Spatial 
perspective,” Journal of Industrial Economics,  
Vol. 31, (1/2), 27-39.  
[4] Cremer, H, M Marchand, and J.F Thisse, 1991, 
“Mixed oligopoly with differentiated products," 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 
Vol. 9, (1), 43-53. 
[5] De Fraja G and F. Delbono, 1990, “Game 
theoretic models of mixed oligopoly," Journal of 
Economic Surveys, Vol. 4, (1), 1-17.  
[6] Gupta B, Pal D, and J. Sarkar, 1997, “Spatial 
Cournot competition and agglomeration in a 
model of location choice,” Regional Science and 
Urban Economics, Vol.27 (3), 261-282.  
[7] Hamilton, J.H and S.M Slutsky, 1990, 
“Endogenous timing in duopoly games: 
Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria," Games and 
Economic Behavior, Vol. 2, (1), 29-46. 
[8] Hotelling, H, 1929, “Stability in Competition,” 
Economic Journal, Vol. 39, (153), 41-57.   
[9] Kato, K, 2006, “Can allowing to trade permits 
enhance welfare in mixed oligopoly?," Journal of 
Economics, Vol.88, 263-283. 
[10] Matsumura T, 1998, “Partial privatization in 
mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, 
Vol.70, 473-483.  
[11] Matsushima, N, 2001, “Cournot competition and 
spatial agglomeration revisited,” Economics 
Letters, Vol. 73, No. 2, 175-177. 
[12] Matsushima, N and T, Matsumura, 2003, “Mixed 
oligopoly and spatial agglomeration,” Canadian 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 36, (1), 62-87.  
[13] Naito, T and H Ogawa, 2009, “Direct versus 
indirect environmental regulation in a partially 
privatized mixed duopoly,” Environmental 
Economics and Policy Studies, Vol.10, (2)-(4), 
87-100.  
[14] Ogawa, H, 2006, “Capacity choice in the mixed 
duopoly with product differentiation, ” 
Economics Bulletin, Vol.12, (8), 1-6. 
[15] Ogawa, H and Y, Sanjyo, 2007, “Location of 
public firm in the presence of multinational firm: 
A mixed duopoly approach,” Australian 
Economic Papers, Vol.46 (2), 191-203. 
[16] Pal, D, 1998, “Does Cournot competition yield 
spatial agglomeration? ,” Economics Letters 
Vol.60, (1), 49-53. 
―　　―38
徳島大学地域科学研究第 1巻
